Abstract
World-Systemic Crisis and Counter-Hegemony
It is becoming increasingly difficult to ignore that existing global political arrangements are unsustainable and in a state of crisis, if not collapse. World-systems scholars have traced today's growing "systemic chaos" to the 1970s and the start of U.S. hegemonic decline (Wallerstein 2002) .
Earlier world-systemic transitions link the demise of hegemonic powers to new challenges from other contenders for world power. The resulting competition generates growing chaos and violence as the declining regime collapses (Arrighi and Silver 1999; Chase-Dunn 2002; Chase-Dunn and Boswell 2004; Chase-Dunn et al. 2010) . Hegemonic power requires the articulation of a "hegemonic regime" that helps order the system, and for the period of U.S. hegemony, the post-WWII international order and the United Nations and Bretton Woods systems have defined that regime. Among other factors, the Trump administration's abandonment of international institutions and law undermines the legitimacy of the institutions that enable and support U.S. global leadership. This is particularly dangerous, given today's scale of militarization and the extensive competition over and deterioration of ecosystems.
Mainstream media and politicians' accounts focus on and contribute to extreme political polarization, ignoring other, more cooperative ways people and communities have attempted to find solutions to the burdens of economic globalization. The ideas progressive counter-hegemonic movements are generating about how to advance forms of cooperation that better meet people's needs have thus been left out of wider public deliberation about how to address the urgent challenges we face. By ignoring the accounts of these movements, we prevent serious intellectual engagement with the questions of what kind of world-system might replace the one that is clearly failing the majority of the world's people, and what actors and strategies might help move us from an increasingly volatile and polarized system to a preferred alternative. Linking world-systemic forces with the evolution of social movements, Arrighi and Silver argued:
In past hegemonic transitions, dominant groups successfully took on the task of fashioning a new world order only after major wars, systemwide chaos and intense pressure from movements of protest and self-protection. This pressure from below has widened and deepened from transition to transition, leading to enlarged social blocs with each new hegemony.
Thus, we can expect social contradictions to play a far more decisive role than ever before in shaping both the unfolding transition and whatever new world order eventually emerges out of the impending systemic chaos. But whether the movements will largely follow and be shaped by the escalation jwsr.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2018.850
of violence (as in past transitions) or precede and effectively work toward containing the systemic chaos is a question that is open. Its answer is
ultimately in the hands of the movements. (Arrighi and Silver 1999:289, emphasis added) We take this argument as our starting point, contending that attention to transnational efforts of activist groups to articulate collective identities and responses to global problems can help us identify emerging popular global projects and possible pathways to transformative change that address contemporary challenges. We map changes in the population of transnational social movement organizations to assess what these might reveal about the capacities of movements to advance a fundamentally different world-system-one that is far more democratic and responsive to the needs of people and our planet.
As Arrighi and Silver (1999) argued, what is different today from earlier hegemonic transitions is far more extensive organizing across national borders and identities. This is critical to the formation of a counter-hegemonic force capable of advancing alternatives to the dominant order. The global nature of the world-system requires a globalized movement response, as earlier anti-colonial and social democratic movements have shown (Wallerstein 2014) .
In addition to their increased transnational nature, we know from varied accounts that today's counter-hegemonic movements are also less hierarchical in structure than the traditional left, and they are more networked with national and local-level activists and organizations (Juris 2008; Wolfson and Funke 2017) . Carroll argues that since the 1990s global activism has involved a wider range of subaltern groups embracing more radical and coherent agendas (Carroll 2007 :39) . His analysis of a selection of what he calls "transnational activist policy groups," or TAPGs, revealed that these have become "more institutionalized, complex and networked" (2007:53, emphasis original; 2016) . They have also engaged in "more continuous and cumulative knowledge production, campaigns and outreach," reaching broader constituencies than was true in the past.
Not only are more diverse, localized, and less elite groups engaging more deeply in global political spaces, they are also articulating and advocating for what Carroll and Sapinski call "postcapitalist alternatives" (Carroll and Sapinski 2013; Carroll 2016 ; see also Steger, Goodman and Wilson 2013)-that is, they are advancing an explicit global political project that seeks to replace globalized capitalism. Thus, in addition to these changes in the character of transnational organizations and their local-global networks, we find important ideological changes documented through research on various campaigns and organizations. For instance, today's activists are less preoccupied with capturing state power-a project that has thus far failed to achieve movements' ultimate goals of greater equity and democracy-and more attentive to processes of advancing Chase-Dunn et al. 2007; Della Porta 2005; Reese et al. 2008; Santos 2006; Sen 2013; Sen et al. 2003; Steger et al. 2013; Wallerstein 2014) .
The cultural and ideological work emerging among global movement forces have led numerous analysts to describe them in Gramscian terms as historic bloc formation and the furthering of a counter-hegemonic "war of position" (Carroll 2016; Goodman and Salleh 2013; Katz 2006 ). Gramsci's war of position involves work by insurgents to shape popular understandings and cultivate cultural and ideological support for transformative agendas as part of a long-term struggle for power. Such efforts are less visible than more overt and confrontational forms of conflict reflected in the "war of maneuver," yet they are critical to any effort for transformative change.
We can also compare these movements with Polanyi's analysis of early 20 th century mobilizations and the "double movement" for social protection from capitalist exploitation (see Boswell and Chase-Dunn 2000; Chase-Dunn 2005 In their account of antisystemic movements, Arrighi, Hopkins and Wallerstein argue that the basic threats to the system stem from the contradictions between the "relations of rule and the relations of production " (1989:92) . These contradictions are reflected in growing contention over what Wallerstein (1991) calls the "geoculture"-i.e., value systems that normalize patriarchy, nationalism, and racism and that place a primacy on wealth accumulation. Many of the organizations we asses in this paper challenge this geo-culture, and they are working to address power inequities such as that between the global North and South. The rise of austerity and growing failure of the system to provide for people's basic needs-not just in the periphery but increasingly in the core-contribute to a crisis of legitimacy, as more people question the ideology that supports the capitalist world-system. Coupled with this is the rise of human rights discourse and growing "civilizational conflict" (Arrighi et al. 1989:92 ; see also Moghadam 2012) . Thus, we expect to find in the population of transnational movements substantial segments devoted to efforts to provide for people's basic economic welfare and human rights (including rights to a safe and healthy environment) and to challenge western modernist hegemony and authorities (Proposition 1). Moreover, we expect that over time, movements will have developed greater ideological coherence as participants engage with one another and develop deeper understandings of the issues around which they struggle and their interconnections (Proposition 2).
A primary and persistent structure of inequality is the core-periphery division through which hegemonic powers preserve and advance their own material accumulation and political influence at the expense of weaker players. Thus, we propose that if the population of transnational social movements indeed has counter-hegemonic potential, we should expect it to reflect greater participation and leadership from outside the core countries, namely the global South (Proposition 3). 4 Another shift in the geographic makeup of TSMOs that would signal a change in the organization of power in the world-system is a decentralization of organizations away from global structures like the UN or WTO towards regional entities (Proposition 4). As people working within regions seek to influence global policies and agendas, they must build unified positions and strategies with neighbors, thereby helping decenter power and influence in the system. Below we explore geographic patterns of transnational organization to determine whether we see more At the same time, while we expect movements to remain engaged with the inter-state system, we know that in many issue areas-most notably feminist and environmental movements-there have been heated struggles over questions of whether and how to engage with governments and inter-governmental agencies. While the United Nations system presents possibilities for advancing counter-hegemonic notions of human rights, global financial institutions such as the World Bank and World Trade Organization have overshadowed the UN in their ideological influence and enforcement capacity, and over time capitalist elites have also mobilized UN agencies to support neoliberal projects and to coopt segments of civil society (Bruno and Karliner 2002; Charnovitz 2002; Smith 2008, chapter 9) . Thus, if today's movements are becoming increasingly counterhegemonic, then we would expect to see less emphasis on maintaining formal ties to intergovernmental organizations (Proposition 6). As with our proposition regarding regionalism, the decline of connections to the inter-state arena does not necessarily demonstrate growth of progressive counter-hegemony. To make that case we need to go beyond the macro-level data we use in our analysis to examine the content of movement discourses about their global strategies and relations with governments and international agencies. Nevertheless, patterns of regional and global ties can help us address questions about global social cohesion and polarization.
Below we describe the data we use to evaluate our propositions about changes in the population of transnational social movement organizations and our methods for organizing these data. Our analyses aim to address the propositions outlined above and discuss what the patterns we observe suggest about possibilities for counter-hegemonic globalization. We conclude with some overall observations and suggestions for future research.
Methods and Data
The data for our study come from the Transnational Social Movement Organization (TSMO) using a detailed set of selection criteria to identify organizations whose primary purpose was to advance some form of social or political change (Plummer, Smith and Hughes 2017) . Whereas we include records of right-wing organizations, the data for such groups is not reliable due to their often covert nature and the resulting lack of information in Yearbook entries.
Our analysis here excludes trade unions, but TSMOs working to promote worker rights are included. 9 We reviewed and merged organizational entries across the years of the dataset, noting name changes and mergers as well as dissolutions. We also reviewed organizations' goals and reevaluated and updated our coding scheme taking into account the changes in how issues and goals There is also lag time between a group's founding and its entry into the Yearbook. Smith, Plummer and Hughes (2017) . The following years are excluded from the time series due to the lack of availability of access to the printed, English language editions of the Yearbook: 1955; 1957; 1975; 1979. jwsr.org | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2018.850
To help account for the limitations of the dataset as well as to aid our interpretation and analysis, we draw from extensive secondary accounts and from Smith's extensive qualitative research on transnational social movement organizing, which focused in particular on the World Social Forum Process and the movements engaged in that arena (Smith et al. 2011; Smith et al. 2014) . This large body of qualitative research allows us to better interpret the macro-level data.
Given the complexity of the global political arena in which these groups operate and the multifaceted and changing nature of the issues around which social movements mobilize, such qualitative evidence is imperative for making sense of the data we present.
In conducting our analysis, we looked at changes 
Patterns of Change in the Transnational Social Movement Sector
The late 20 th and early 21 st centuries have been characterized by the expansion and increased institutionalization of inter-state politics. We have seen, in short, a proliferation of intergovernmental organizations, treaties and treaty-monitoring bodies, and a thickening of institutional apparatus to advance transnational communication and exchange and to address transnational and global concerns (Boli and Thomas 1999; Meyer et al. 1997a; 1997b The general story here is that people are increasingly organizing across national boundaries to advance various social change goals. Figure 1 shows that the number of formally organized
TSMOs grew from around 100 in the years immediately following WWII to more than 2000 by the end of the first decade of the 21 st Century. The bulk of new organizational growth came after 1990, with the end of the Cold War and the convening of a series of global conferences addressing issues such as women's rights, development, peace, environment, and human rights. The UN global conferences served as "training grounds" for civil society activists working to affect global policies, providing resources for more individuals to participate in global political spaces, opportunities for activists to learn about global issues and be exposed to diverse perspectives, and occasions for networking with activists from different parts of the world (Archer 1983; Willetts 1996b ). 1953 1959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1977 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 The development of new communications technologies and low-cost transportation have also contributed to this growth of transnational activism. Thus, the growth evident in Figure 1 is just the tip of the iceberg of transnational activism, significantly underestimating the scale of activity.
While technology has encouraged and strengthened transnational organizing, it has also enabled more people to connect transnationally even without the aid of formal transnational structures.
Thus, more groups working at national and local levels have been able to participate directly in transnational alliances and global meetings (Desai 2015; Juris 2008a; von Bülow 2010) . Indeed, at the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development, the United Nations recognized this reality and for the first time began allowing national organizations to gain accreditation status with official UN bodies, beginning with the Commission on Sustainable Development (Charnovitz 1997; Willetts 1996a despite the limitations of these data, we believe they can provide important insights into global movements and their relationships to changes in the world-system. Table 1 shows the issues around which TSMOs have organized, and we present the percentages of groups whose work addresses the most common issue areas. In Table 2 , we consider the share of TSMOs in a given year that report at least one member in a geographic region. This analysis shows that while the over-representation of Western Europe and North America have persisted, the percentages of groups with members in these two regions has declined somewhat over recent decades, as the overall population of TSMOs has grown substantially. Thus, in absolute terms, there are higher levels of engagement from outside these core regions than there was in earlier periods. The most significant increase in participation comes from the region of Central Asia, especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union. 
33.6%
1 We present the percentage of all TSMOs in each year that report the presence of any country members. 2 The share of TSMOs claiming a regional identity is calcultated as a share of all TSMOs in each year. The N's are 255 in 1973, 489 in 1983, 844 in 1993, 1434 in 2003, and 1767 in 2013. While we see some small changes in the geographic makeup of TSMO participation, an important organizational development is a growing tendency for activists to organize on a regional jwsr.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2018.850 basis. Over the years we studied, the percentage of regionally-organized groups rose from 5% in 1973 to 38% of all organizations in 2013. Much of this growth is observable in groups formed after the end of the Cold War, which are more likely than older groups to be regionally organized.
Indeed, auxiliary analysis by founding year shows that as of 2013, nearly half of all groups formed in 1990 or thereafter (46%) identified as part of a region (as indicated by their organizational name or aims), compared to 28% of those formed in earlier years. In addition, of TSMOs that reported country memberships in 2013, 16% of those formed after the Cold War reported having members in a single region, versus 6% of older TSMOs. This increasing tendency towards regionalism reflects what has been happening in the inter-state system with the creation and strengthening of regional IGOs, and it provides some support for our argument that we are seeing more decentralized leadership challenging U.S. global hegemony. Whether such regionalization indicates a trend towards greater conflict and polarization or towards greater democratization and institutionalization of local and regional voices into multi-level global processes is a question for future research.
One further insight we have found is that TSMOs appear to be changing how they structure their organizational memberships. We noticed in the Yearbook entries a greater tendency for groups to report "no formal members," which we read-in combination with evidence from case studies and discussions with organizers-to signal a shift towards less formal and more fluid organizational structures that do not conform to state boundaries. More TSMOs are themselves made up of organizational members-both transnational and otherwise. Also, analysts have pointed to the important role of individual leaders, "rooted cosmopolitans," (Tarrow 2005 ) and global-local "translators" (Merry 2006) in transnational organizations and campaigns. Thus, many activists use the network term to describe their organizational practices and structures. This suggests both the dynamic character of transnational organizing and perhaps also a decline in the significance of national borders and identities as activists work to innovate new, globally relevant democratic forms. If this interpretation withstands further scrutiny, it too would provide evidence to suggest that we are witnessing important changes in the inter-state system and its hegemonic role in structuring how individuals associate across borders.
In addition to various factors that privilege core countries as hosts of most TSMOs, the institutional arrangements of the inter-state order reproduce core country advantages, placing the headquarters for virtually all major IGOs in cities in Europe or the United States. Since TSMOs are often working to monitor IGOs or to work with groups that may locate themselves in proximity with these headquarters, it makes sense for these groups to place their transnational headquarters in the North. But if the legitimacy of the current system is in crisis and open to challenge from counter-hegemonic forces, it bears asking if we see more leadership and participation from outside jwsr.org | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2018.850 the core. While imperfect, one measure that allows us to assess such change is in the location of TSMO headquarters. Our auxiliary analysis shows that the percentage of TSMO headquarters in the global South rose from 11% in 1973 to 25% in 2013. Moreover, as of 2013, groups formed after 1989 were more likely to be based in the South than those formed in earlier years (28% vs. 21%). Nevertheless, the continued dominance of the global North reflects a persistent underrepresentation of Southern voices in global politics. 13, 14 We further explored how groups' issue focus shapes whether their headquarters were located in the global South. Table 3 shows comparisons between groups working on some of the most popular as well as most contentious and polarized issues in global politics-peace, women's rights, environmental issues, and indigenous rights. The results show a general trend across For each of the seven issues reported in Table 3 , substantially more TSMOs were headquartered in the global South than was true for other issues. Also, in auxiliary analysis, we found that TSMOs formed after the Cold War were more likely to be headquartered in the South.
This pattern was most pronounced for indigenous rights groups (a cohort difference of 34% in 2013), followed by peace groups and women's rights groups (a difference of 6% and 4%, respectively). Of course, some of this cohort difference is due to the reduced costs of long-distance
organizing. Yet the differences we see across issues supports our contention that transnational Thus, we considered whether TSMOs that included indigenous people's rights among their goals were more likely to be based outside the core. In 2013, 38% of groups working on indigenous rights were based in the global South, compared with 25% of those with other goals. Of course, 15 The exception is TSMOs focused on the global economy, and we see large fluctuations here that require more detailed analyses of this subset of groups to determine whether changes are the result of groups moving headquarters between North and South or to the headquarters locations of new organizations. 16 Other environmental IGOs, such as the Commission on Sustainable Development, UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, and the Committee on World Food Security, are based in the global North. 17 Our other work has uncovered some important insights into how global issues are framed by movement groups and how this changes over time. Environmental groups may be especially likely to be subjected to efforts at co-optation or to see their framings of issues subverted due to pressures from a more organized and active transnational business elite (Smith, Plummer and Hughes 2017). we note that larger and more concentrated populations of indigenous peoples tend to be located in the global South, and this likely explains much of this difference. Yet, coupled with our observation about women's mobilization, and given that indigenous ideas and framings have found their way into the central discourses in social movement spaces such as the World Social Forums as well as climate justice and food debates, we might see this reflecting the expectation that counter-hegemonic mobilization emerges from outside the core (see, e.g., Markoff 2003; Santos 2006; Arrighi et al. 1989 ). In particular, it seems that the most system-challenging claimants are likely to adopt organizational forms that challenge hegemonic structures such as North-South hierarchies and the construction of issues and political claims. These organizations are also more likely to be based in the periphery or among subaltern groups. Comparing the issue focus of TSMOs headquartered in the global North with those in the global South, we found some interesting differences that further support this argument: notably larger percentages of Southheadquartered TSMOs worked on human rights (including women's rights), economic justice, indigenous, and multi-issue goals (See Appendix, Table A2 ).
That women's and indigenous groups have become more visible and vocal in important movement spaces such as the World Social Forums and climate justice politics is thus suggestive of how the analyses these groups bring may be shaping the overall movement field (Conway 2012; Desai 2015; Mendoza 2002) . Among environmental organizations we see a highly visible split between groups working to achieve some inter-state agreement to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and a growing number of organizations seeking more radical actions than those states have put forward. This conflict is articulated in terms of "climate justice," and analysts have observed this growing division among environmentalists since the mid-2000s (Bond 2012; Hadden 2015; Reitan and Gibson 2012) . The articulation of an anti-capitalist critique in climate debates has fueled some important progress in advancing ideas that could actually reduce emissions and contribute to more meaningful and equitable action to mitigate unequal impacts of climate change, and it has led to new conversations between more mainstream groups and radical movements and frontline communities about how to respond to the failures of states to act on this urgent issue (Smith 2014) . Such conflict may, in fact, be productive in ways similar to how heated debates between feminists in the global North and South fueled new understandings and framings of this issue (Moghadam 2012; Vargas 2003; West 1999) .
Connectivity
Finally, we look at changes in the extensiveness of TSMO connections to other international actors-including both inter-state organizations and international NGOs. Table 4 reports connections between TSMOs and IGOs. The overall trend we see is that, consistent with our expectations, newer TSMOs are making fewer connections to intergovernmental organizations. Thus, it is not accurate to say that newer groups are closing themselves off from the inter-state arena altogether. 19 The pattern of North-South differences reported above is replicated here. In auxiliary analysis, we found that groups based in the global South report fewer average ties to IGOs than their Northern counterparts (1.7 versus 2.3 average ties in 2013). We can interpret the trend seen in Table 4 in different ways. It may support our argument that social movements are shifting their attention from the inter-state system as a source of solutions to the grievances around which they mobilize. After years of experience working within the UN conference framework, many activist groups working on women's rights, environmental justice, and economic and human rights issues have argued that the inter-state political arena is not likely to advance the changes these groups see as urgently needed. In fact, However, these patterns could also mean that TSMOs are creating a more systematic division of labor, with some groups specializing in maintaining ties to IGOs and helping convey relevant information to other groups, which specialize in other pieces of work such as mobilizing local activists or information, coordinating activist coalitions, and communicating with multiple kinds of audiences (Smith 2005 movements that results from their experiences in the course of transnational contention and the shared analyses generated through intra-movement dialogues. In other words, activist groups are not simply engaging these inter-state arenas because they are the 'only game in town,' and when they do engage with them, they are more likely to do so on their own terms and with a clearer sense of their collective goals.
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Finally, the dis-engagement with IGOs may be the result of other changes, such as reduced funding from IGOs themselves to support transnational organizing. Elite backlash against INGO participation in global institutions, government counter-terrorism initiatives, and rising 21 Carroll and Sapinski's (2015) analysis of Transnational Alternative Policy Groups and their networks with IGOs and funders provides evidence in support of this argument. Their study of leading organizations in alternative globalization movements showed comparable rates of connection with both IGOs and INGOs among these groups, which we would expect to be most central in the overall TSMO networks. Most TSMOs in our study show relatively more ties to INGOs than to IGOs. 22 Examples of the strategic thinking that is emerging from the work of transnational activism is especially clear in Pat Mooney's 2012 discussion, "Civil Society Strategies and the Stockholm Syndrome." Mooney points out the multipronged strategy of environmental groups whereby some groups boycotted official processes while others engaged in them to exert influence "or simply to execute 'damage control.'" Also, Morgan (2007) describes the complex ways indigenous movements were shaped by and in turn shaped global institutions. The UN processes related to indigenous peoples' rights were the outcomes of activism, but they also provided spaces and focal points that contributed to the articulation of global indigenous identities and encouraged more formal transnational organizing. conferences. We also note that while ties between TSMOs and INGOs are becoming more extensive, these reflect just a small portion of the actual ties among activist groups. Our records only report ties to international NGOs, neglecting the far more numerous national and, 23 The category of INGOs includes both TSMOs and other NGOs that are not formally organized to advance social change goals. 24 The network data we are currently collecting reveals that TSMOs are also increasingly reporting other INGOs as members. actors, and our data show strong and persistent levels of connection with international NGOs. The evidence we present here reflects just a small subset of international network connections, which are proliferating among national and local groups due to advances in technology. The long history of counter-hegemonic struggles provides a foundation for local activists who see the growing effects of global politics on local problems.
INGO ties
Discussion & Conclusion
At a time of growing chaos and instability in the capitalist world-system, we provide evidence of an expanding and increasingly organized and interconnected transnational social movement sector.
Our study has shown that the population of formally organized groups working across national borders to promote social change has expanded dramatically over the past six decades, and it has become more unified around a set of demands that increasingly include making fundamental challenges to globalized capitalism. We argue that we can understand these changes by situating them in their world-historic context of U.S. hegemonic decline and changing inter-state institutional arrangements that have decentralized global leadership.
Organizing around demands for human rights and environmental protection-notably demands for what are essentially and increasingly the rights to the means of survivaltransnational activist groups have developed more strategic approaches to the global political arena and are forging their own alternatives to inter-state political agendas. Newer organizations are more likely to be headquartered in the global South, and women's and indigenous groups were more likely than groups working on other issues to be based in the South. Although they continue to work with intergovernmental organizations, they are more selective in their ties. At the same time, they are continuing to connect with other civil society actors and are finding ways to jwsr.pitt.edu | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2018.850 strengthen connections between global and local political arenas. We found variation between groups working on different issues, suggesting that particular institutional arrangements and/or conflict dynamics are shaping transnational organizing.
Taken together, these patterns show evidence of what Evans referred to as counter-hegemonic globalization. Yet, because we see a growing tendency for newer groups to be organized regionally and for them to be less connected to intergovernmental agencies, we might refer to this shift away from global-level integration as more aptly named "counter-hegemonic deglobalization." 25 However, unlike the nationalism reflected in Brexit or Trump's attempts to redefine NAFTA, counter-hegemonic deglobalization emphasizes the elimination of globalized trade and financial regimes in order to enhance the abilities of people and local communities-rather than states and corporations-to organize in ways that address their needs (Bello 2003) . As with Evans's counterhegemonic globalization, they thus "[maximize] democratic political control and [make] the equitable development of human capabilities and environmental stewardship its priorities" (2008: 272) . Importantly, such work to empower communities remains global in its vision, and we found that TSMOs continue to proliferate and encourage horizontal ties that transcend state boundaries.
We distinguish this from the counter-hegemonic projects led by nationalist movements or by states, which emphasize the replacement of the United States with a new hegemonic (and capitalist) state. Counter-hegemonic deglobalization thus paves the way for subaltern projects to become more viable. For instance, the global spread and promotion of Via Campesina's notion of "food sovereignty" reflects the principle of local control and subsidiarity. Common slogans in the global justice movement include "unity in diversity," and the Zapatista call for "one world with room for many worlds." These examples capture ideas common among transnational and other activists, that the world could be organized along a common set of principles that are shared globally but that enable local autonomy and choice about community priorities, values, and ways of being in the world.
Understanding the implications of these broad patterns for counter-hegemonic struggle requires further exploration of the wealth of qualitative evidence about transnational organizing. Do we see evidence of Evans's "counter-hegemonic globalization," or of a Gramscian war of position? Carroll's work helps us better appreciate how activities within these organizations might contribute to such fundamental changes in the world-system. His detailed look at global justice networks exposes the cognitive work these groups do to challenge hegemonic knowledge and alter 25 We are grateful to Chris Chase-Dunn for suggesting this term.
jwsr.org | DOI 10.5195/JWSR.2018.850 how people understand their own identities and their social conditions. They are asking participants to engage their political imaginations to envision ways of making global policy more responsive and accountable to popular needs. At the same time, they are working to build unity, or solidarity, by expanding participants' notions of (global) citizenship and political community, forging collective identities that transcend national political and other boundaries (see, e.g., Carroll 2016; della Porta 2005). Thus, rather than replicating existing unequal order, a growing body of work shows that some transnational activist groups are engaging what Carroll calls a "logic of prefiguration" of an alternative order and, through praxis, they are "discovering political methodologies that activate democratic social learning as to how we might live differently" (Carroll 2007:53-54) .
At a time when mass media highlights right-wing politics and racist and xenophobic tensions, this study documents the less-told but critically important story of the growth of transnational organizing for a more democratic, equitable, and sustainable world-system. Our exploration of several propositions about the population of TSMOs can inform more in-depth examinations of particular conflicts, regions, and activist network dynamics. We hope this research will advance new attention to this field of transnational movements and their possible roles in helping address some of the systemic challenges our world faces and inform activist-scholarship on questions of how these movements can become more sustainable and influential. In particular, work to uncover some of the connections between the transnational organizations we study here and local political spaces is needed. In this time of systemic crisis, more local activists are finding they must defend local interests while drawing lessons and ideas from prior social movement campaigns and the transnational networks of activists waging them. The survival of people and local communities depends increasingly on such work. 
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